Abstract-Mobile systems are facing a number of application vulnerabilities that can be combined together and utilized to penetrate systems with devastating impact. When assessing the overall security of a mobile system, it is important to assess the security risks posed by each mobile applications (apps), thus gaining a stronger understanding of any vulnerabilities present. This paper aims at developing a three-layer framework that assesses the potential risks which apps introduce within the Android mobile systems. A Bayesian risk graphical model is proposed to evaluate risk propagation in a layered risk architecture. By integrating static analysis, dynamic analysis, and behavior analysis in a hierarchical framework, the risks and their propagation through each layer are well modeled by the Bayesian risk graph, which can quantitatively analyze risks faced to both apps and mobile systems. The proposed hierarchical Bayesian risk graph model offers a novel way to investigate the security risks in mobile environment and enables users and administrators to evaluate the potential risks. This strategy allows to strengthen both app security as well as the security of the entire system.
service [2] , and the overall detection rate utilizing its anti-virus tools give an overall detection rates of 20.41% [3] , which is significantly lower than the third part anti-virus apps that range from 51.02%−100% [1] [2] [3] [4] .
Although awareness is constantly rising, the Android-based mobile systems are exposed to strong and significant security threats and many issues are reported each day [2] , [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . The peculiarities of mobile systems have been well known and many approaches have been developed to protect them. In general, a security solution for mobile systems begins with risk assessment to determine the threats and loss expectancy. Many risk assessment models have been proposed to model the risks, attacks, and threats in mobile systems, including attack graphs [5] , attack tree [6] , Bayesian belief model [9] , and hybrid Bayesian network [10] . However, many of these models fail to consider the causal-relations of risks, and consequently the contributory causes of threats are ignored [3] , [11] [12] [13] .
In [5] and [6] , Bayesian networks are used to model vulnerability management and potential attack paths, which make it possible to quantitatively evaluate the likelihood that an attack happens. In [10] , a Bayesian network model is developed that can calculate the posterior probabilities of states of risks. Assessing the risks of apps or mobile systems is a crucial aspect in determining security state, information protection, and related security controlling. The capability of the Bayesian probabilistic model is a significant motivation to investigate risks analysis by analyzing the likelihood of app (or system) compromise by chaining Bayesian rules in the proposed three-layered framework.
In this paper, the term "risk" is used to denote an unsafe state or behavior of an app or system that is related to vulnerabilities or threats. In mobile systems there are two fundamental risks sources.
1) The apps distribution platform, the Google App Store, might be a source of potential security risks. Users generally always accept all permission requests requested during app installation. This can lead to overprivilege authority in apps and can lead to privacy and security-relevant vulnerabilities.
2) The fragmentation of apps, devices, and OS versions.
The existence of multiple versions of Android and the huge number of developers may lead to customized modifications of Android, and these could be riddled with security vulnerabilities. In mobile systems, security assessment generally involves the risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation for both apps and the underlying system [13] , [16] [17] [18] [19] . This paper aims to develop a risk analysis framework to systematically assess the potential risks present in a mobile system. The hierarchical model decomposes risks in an app (or the system) with interdependencies into three layers (static analysis layer, dynamic analysis layer, and behavior analysis layer). Each layer focuses on specific aspects and needs. The framework then combines all specific risks in a coherent way and captures all possible causes of identified risks by applying a Bayesian risk graph (BRG).
The hierarchical BRG (HBRG) features: 1) a different approach than most existing static analysis, this model integrates the potential risks analysis over: static risk layer, dynamic risk layer, and behavioral risk layer; 2) it can help users to find the dominating risk causes; 3) it is able to determine out-system cause and effects (e.g., for two different mobile systems A and B, it can analyze the probability that B will fail if A fails); and 4) provide risks scores, so that when evaluating the potential risks in a mobile system, the model will grade each application with an app-related risk-score as well as a score for the whole mobile system.
II. CHALLENGES IN MOBILE RISKS ANALYSIS
In building a secure mobile environment, several key strategic issues should be considered [20]: 1) develop a risk model that can identify the potential risks of data loss based on a trusted risk assessment; 2) provide a dynamic risk analysis module, which should be able to keep up with the rapid pace found in the Android ecosystem; 3) evaluate each app installed using a risk assessment service that assigns them each a risk score. For example, if you install an app with a high-risk score, you should block or disable exploitable resources until the app is removed; and 4) layer the security, so that exploiting a system requires multiple vulnerabilities to penetrate the multiple layers of the security model.
Recently, a number of risk assessment methods have been proposed in the network security domain, such as the probabilistic risk model [6] , inoperability input-output models [9] , and hierarchical holographic models (HMMs) [10] . In general, a complex system can be decomposed with interdependencies into several independent views, each of them focuses on different aspects and needs. One such set of views could include: 1) static analysis aspects to model the problem; 2) dynamic analysis to the security planning process; and 3) behavior analysis to the susceptible behaviors analysis for apps. However, in the Android mobile systems, the huge number of apps and platform variants makes the risk evaluation difficult, as the probability of each potential risk needs to be considered in security planning. The major challenges in performing an Android risk analysis can be summarized as follows.
1) Security Vulnerabilities Are Rampant: As reported in [21] , mobile app security concerns are growing in importance and 96% of all tested applications have one or more serious security issue, such as privacy (90%), overprivileges (80%), session authentication (53%), input validation (62%), and infrastructure (66%). This makes it difficult to find all potential risks when assessing apps and mobile systems [21] . an important challenge to protect apps and mobile systems from threats, allowing incident intelligence to identify risks before they become a focal point for mobile system attacks. In app-based systems, when an app attack happened, it is crucial to be able to predict the possibility that it will occur in other mobile systems, thus help to reduce the spread of similar attacks and the costs incurred. By communicating with developers, vendors, or app stores, the "out-system risks analysis scheme" can create a roadmap of risk across multiple systems. To address the anticipated risks, users could for instance review the use of a particular app with the knowledge that it has been reported on another platform. A mature risk assessment model should provide both realtime analysis and risk trend analysis over time for both apps and mobile systems. This paper meets these challenges by capturing vulnerability interdependencies and measuring security in a similar way that real attackers penetrate the mobile system, providing an assessment framework of overall systems risks as well as that related to individual apps.
III. MOBILE SYSTEMS RISK MODELING
In risk assessment modeling it is essential to be able to identify what each app is actually doing. A hierarchical risk analysis architecture is able to accurately identify vulnerabilities, while a BRG can capture the interdependencies among the vulnerabilities posed by apps and the mobile systems. In this paper, hierarchical risk analysis is combined with a BRG to accurately model the risk states, propagations, and transitions. Fig. 1 shows a typical HBRG model, which integrates a hierarchical risk analysis architecture into a BRG. It consists of a three-layer architecture and each layer extracts featured risks to form a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Each edge between nodes in the graph denotes the probabilistic causal dependencies. Based on the DAG, a Bayesian Network model could be created, in which each node maintains a conditional probabilities table (CPT). The parental nodes in the HBRG are assumed to be marginally independent. The relations in the HBRGs denote the transition probabilities between nodes, which are classified into three aspects: 1) intralayer relations, which connect the nodes within a layer; 2) interlayer relations, cover the connections between two adjacent layers; and 3) crosslayer relations, denoting the links which bridge between the behavior layer and static layer. In order to reduce the computation complexity, cross-layer relation can be converted into two interlayer relations by adding a virtual node concept. In Fig. 1 , the cross-layer relation from S3 to B3 can be translated into two interlayer relations, where Da is the newly created virtual node and P(B3|Da) = 1. The virtual node Da can be seen as a copy of node B3 in dynamic layer without needing interrelations in the dynamic layer. By doing this, the complexity of the relation space could be significantly reduced.
In HBRG, the model parameters (CPTs and transition probabilities) are always estimated using statistical learning algorithms [4] , [5] , [9] . Statistically, CPTs evaluation requires many samples to test whether a risk can or cannot cause other effect or make a contribution to other risks. Fortunately, the Genome dataset released by the Malware Genome Project [32] have collected more than 1200 malware app samples that cover the majority of existing Android malware families. This dataset has been successfully used to detect most existing malware apps. In this paper, the genome dataset is used to statistically learn risk features at the static, dynamic, and behavioral layers to build accurate CPTs.
A. Bayesian Risks Graph Model
The process that one or more vulnerabilities propagate to one or more different threats could be defined with a dependence graph. The risk states or its propagation are usually constructed as a DAG and the transitions between nodes could be modeled with local conditional probabilities.
A DAG can be modeled with a Bayesian graph model G = {V, E}, in which the nodes V denotes the variables of risks, and the edges E denote relations between nodes that can be described with conditional probability distributions. For each variable S i ∈ V, a conditional probability distribution P(S i |Pa(S i )) is used to describe the transition. Pa(S i ) denotes the parent set of S i in G. The Bayesian model reflects a conditional independence statement, which could significantly reduce the number of parameters needed.
The Bayesian network model needs to be extended to encode the apps risk conditions as a BRG. The BRG is a powerful but intuitive tool for modeling, analyzing, and predicting risks in mobile systems. It supports both app and mobile system security risk analysis. A unique joint probability distribution over V, could be verified to be
where S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n } is a set of Bernoulli random variables and P(S i |π i ) denotes the conditional probability of S i given the condition of π i . For example, for a set S = {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 , S 5 }, the joint probability of all the variables can be derived with (1)
Definition 1 (CPT): In a BRG, the quantitative parameters must be specified. Each node maintains a CPT to describe the conditional probability distribution for a particular combination of values of its parental nodes.
Definition 2 (Hierarchical Risk Template):
A hierarchicalrisk-template is a generic property of the structured risktemplate that at least includes one of three basic properties.
1) Behavior risk which includes the potential threats that are based on the behavior analysis. 2) Dynamic risk which involves potential risks based on the dynamic analysis, such as app activities, network activities, etc. 3) Static risk which includes the potential risks and threats based on the static analysis, such as malware, size analysis, permission analysis, virus matching, etc. The hierarchical risk template provides BRG, a template that describes the basic potential risks of an app or a mobile system. It can help us categorize the properties of risks in mobile systems. For example, "accessing the contact list" is an instance of dynamic risk.
Definition 3 (Risk Attribute): This is a binary attribute representing the state of an instance of a risk. A risk S is associated with a state (S = 1, true) or (S = 0, false). The probability that risk S happens is Pr(S = 1). When an app (or system) is compromised it means the risk state of the app (or system) is true(S = 1). Therefore
is the probability of the state being S = 0. Definition 4 (Atomic Risk): Atomic risk is a risk that cannot be further broken down into smaller parts and retain their meaning in the context of an risk. Typical example is vulnerability identifiers. Let S denote a set of risks. A : S×S → [0, 1] denotes a set of relationships in S. Then given S pre , S post ∈ S, and thus a : S pre → S post can be identified as an atomic risk if: 1) S pre = S post ; 2) given S pre = 1, S post = 1 with probability
Hence, A − S allows an action to compromise the risk S post from S pre with a nonzero probability. Thus S pre is the stage before the risk occurred, and S post is the state after the risk occurred.
Definition 5 (BRG):
A BRG is a tuple (S, ξ, T ), in which S = R B ∪ R D ∪ R S denotes the set of attributes from three risk layers. R B , R D , and R S denote the risks from the behavior layer, the dynamic layer, and the static layer, respectively.
ξ ⊆ S × S denotes the space of risks. A risk states pair 
Here T denotes conditional probability table CPT. Fig. 2 shows a simple BRG example, in which the risk r a could be caused by subrisks r b and(or) r c , and iteratively r b could be redivided into r e and r d , where r d , r e , and r c are atomic risks and thus could not be further divided. The basic idea of the BRG is to calculate the probability of r a according to its parental conditional probabilities.
Definition 6 (Risks Combination): For a risk S j in a BRG, S j ∈ S R ∪ S D ∪ S B , then assuming that S i ∈ Pa[S j ] and S i → S j , then there are two kinds of possibilities to consider for risks combination: 1) AND-combination and 2) OR-combination. As shown in Fig. 3 , the AND-combination denotes each subrisk is a distinct event and the chance of r a to be true depends on the success of each individual subrisk (r b and r c ). For the OR-combination, the chance of r a to be true depends on the success of at least one of individual subrisks (r b or r c ). The probability could be defined as
B. Hierarchical BRG
The HBRG is a hierarchical model formed by a three layer BRG. Fig. 1 shows a typical HBRG model that consists of a Bayesian network (BN) model at each layer. A risk-evaluation process performs at each layer and a compound risk evaluation will be given for each app (or system).
An HBRG can be represented with a double combination of G HBRG and a relationships set R as < G HBRG , R >.
} denotes the BRGs model, in which G S denotes the BRG at the static layer, G D denotes the BRG at the dynamic layer, and G B denotes the BRG at the behavioral layer, respectively. The relationships among random variables at each node are constrained by the model structure and a DAG obeying the usual conditional independence assumptions. Specifically, the arcs between the BRG nodes represent probabilistic causal dependencies. For each BRG, the joint probability distribution function is defined as in (1). 2) Relation R, a key concept of the HBRN model, provides the bridge among the layered BRG. R is a set of associations {R ij |(i = 1, 2, . . . , m); j ∈ (1, 2, . . . , n)} with R ij = 1 implying that node S i is assigned to state true of relationship with node S j .
IV. HIERARCHICAL RISK ASSESSMENT WITH BRGS
The Android security model is primarily based on a sandbox and permissions mechanisms, in which an app is running in a specific Dalvik virtual machine with a unique user ID. In general, each app runs in isolation from all others apps, and so each app cannot access to other app's resources. An app is signed using a certificate by the developer, to confirm the integrity of the app. To conserve resources, apps with the same ID can also arrange to run in the same process, sharing the same VM. Apps can be granted permissions, and these are displayed to the user for approval before the app is installed. However, users tend to ignore the permissions that an app requests, and there are many reasons for this to happen [22] [23] [24] [25] .
Forensically, the risk detection, finding, and evaluation are important for providing users a safe mobile platform. The hierarchical risk assessment framework is able to conduct three layers of in-depth risk analysis for both apps and mobile systems.
A. Static Risk Analysis
A number of static risk analysis methods have been developed to examine the potential risks that an app can exhibit [1] , [2] , [26] . However, most of them are constrained to certain performance capabilities due to their inherent limitation of not actually executing the code. In Android systems, the static analysis is mainly focused on disassembling the binary file (APK) to check source code (e.g., classes.dex, smali, AndroidManifest.xml). This permits the static risk analysis to scan an app's permission requests, API calls, and check discrepancies between the two, including the following stages: 1) app-decompile into smali format; 2) information extractor; 3) API calls parse; 4) permission analysis; 5) grouping of critical API calls; 6) embedded sources; and 7) log monitor and parser. Commonly used analysis tools have been developed, such as apktool, baksmali, fiwalk, and icat [25] .
The static analysis can also provide insights into the third part software development kits, libraries, API calls, and app functions that are employed within an app. Most of the existing mobile security schemes are using static risk analysis to identify malicious apps [1] , [2] , [26] . For example, Jiang [27] found that the BOOT_COMPLETED event registration was used in over 83% of the malware apps sample dataset, and given the assumption that this event registration would occur less frequently in legitimate applications. It thus could be used as an indicator for identifying malicious applications. The limitation of static analysis code mapping is that it is unable to effectively evaluate any permission abuse which may occur in the Android system. It also cannot cover dynamic and forgery bytecode calls that can generate false negative in terms of permission requested [28] .
The main goal of the static analysis is to statistically find ways to trigger potentially malicious or risky behaviors before the app runs. Using static risk analysis, one can identify main static risks in an app. The output of static analysis could be used to guide the dynamic analysis, or even help parameterize the dynamic analysis directly. This can significantly reduce the parameters needed when performing dynamic analysis and thus improve its performance.
B. Dynamic Risk Analysis
After completing the static analysis stage, the framework performs a real-time analysis, which evaluates apps under run-time conditions on instrumented emulators or modified hardware devices. The dynamic analysis module could run over a server and perform concrete execution of apps while extracting certain details related with security. The analysis includes the execution of Dalvik bytecode and contains data structures related to a single execution flow through an app, while other methods contain a stack to temporarily retain data about each method that is called at run time. As the execution encounters method calls and returns, this stack grows and shrinks. In this layer, the framework mainly focuses on detecting the following risks and exploits. [29] , DroidMOSS [30] , and Paranoid [31] . The output of this layer includes: 1) components analysis; 2) interapp communication; 3) network connection analysis; 4) method call graph; 5) control flow graph; and 6) a list of relevant in-app behaviors, includes execution of binaries, execution of commands, network events detection, loading of libraries, I/O accessed, and dynamic class-loading. These outputs can be used to determine vulnerabilities or guide further behavior risk analysis.
These results could easily be modified to search for and record any functionality or behavior deemed of interest. Dynamic analysis could check the proactive risks, such as auto-updating, auto-downloading, and repacking.
C. Behavior Risk Analysis
The behavior layer identifies risk behaviors and measures an app's actual activity over time. By leveraging the risks found in the static, dynamic, and behavior layers, the framework can discover hidden, risky behaviors within a mobile app or system. It can then combine all risks to provide an overall risk score, and thus create custom mobile policy. The main goal in this layer is to identify risk behaviors that might bring risks to an app or the mobile system. This process collects both security and privacy information on how an app performs its potentially risky run-time activities. Typical tests in this layer include the following.
1) Auto Exercises Apps at Run-Time:
Each app is autoloaded into a propriety emulator designed to test each app as it would run in its native environment.
2) Perform Credential Auto-Login: This test replicates
login activity by auto-loading necessary credentials for full execution of the app's functionality. This ensures that HBRG can test all aspects of the app's functionalities beyond the login screen.
3) Collect Network Activity for Both SSL and Non-SSL
Activities: Tests designed to monitor any network activity, essentially to see if the app is accessing any third party networks. By doing this, one can at a minimum identify whether such traffic was properly encrypted or not.
4) Determine If App Launches Other Apps During Run-
Time: This security test checks to see if an app sends requests to access/launch other apps during run-time which may allow malicious or risky activity to occur. This type of exposure may allow malicious apps to be "silently" installed on the user's devices as well as giving them the ability to auto-execute apps with malicious intent.
5) Monitor Read/Write Access to Device Directory and
Hardware: This test monitors access to device hardware (i.e., the camera) and also monitors which system files the app can access and how encryption is used for saving information. 6) Abnormal Behaviors Detection: This could be undertaken by checking for abnormal behaviors, such as privacy collections, regularly information uploading, using HTTP POST methods, receiving commands, etc. The typical behavioral analysis methods used in this layer include the following. 1) Machine Learning Classifier: Based on previous training experience and after testing and weighing the security issue, the classifier decided the potential risks that a behavior may bring. 2) Feature Selection: The risky features selection methods are applied for behavior datasets. The behavioral analysis is an effective solution to use characteristic and behavioral-based methods to detect malware by observing the static and/or dynamic behavior and features of mobile systems.
D. Risk Score
The causal risks could be a compound of a set of subrisks produced by the joint effect of other risks. By using the Bayesian theorem, a numerical analysis can be performed to find the probability for each causal-risk. By refining the CPTs, the HBRG can determine: 1) the probability that an attack occurred on an app (or system) and 2) the probability that an app (or system) will fail.
Given the risk values for each app (or system), a weighted risk score for each app (or system) can be easily calculated
in which P(S) ∈ [0, 1]. An app may be threatened by multiple risks, and each risk may lead an individual threat. In this case, the risk level can be calculated with weighted probabilities of each risk [5] . 
E. Contributory Causes Tracking 1) Independent Contributory Causes
Tracking: Forensically, when a risk occur, it is important to find all contributory causes or the probability of causes that make it happened. Assume s = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s k } denotes a group of contributory causes of an attack. Thus
in which N s denotes the number of nodes that cause the attack a; the α k s are the forward variables. Using the likelihood ratio
where P(a) represents the prior probability of a. The posterior probability is the node's belief on the existences of s based on the observation of a. It is the probability of causes that allowed the attack to happen. For each cause in s, it is possible to calculate the probability that contributed to a P(s i |a) = P(s|a)P(a) P(s) =
P(s|a)P(a) P(s|a)P(a) + P(s|a)P(a)
. 
2) Multiple Contributory Causes Tracking:
If an attack happened, the probability of any individual risk could be calculated by applying above approach. Similarly, the model is able to calculate the probability of any individual risk group assumed to cause the attack. The group causes tracking method enables the identification of the group causes of an attack after it happened P(a 1 |s) = P(a 1 a 2 |s) + P(a 1 a 2 |s)
P(a 2 |s) = P(a 1 a 2 |s) + P(a 1 a 2 |s).
Then, we have
in which
F. Determining Out-System Causal Effects
An app could be installed by many users. When an app has failed (or been compromised) on a mobile system, it is important to predict the possibility that the same app will fail (or will be compromised) on other mobile systems. In fact, the observation that an app failed could increase the possibility that an attack will occur on other systems. This prediction could be helpful for refining the CPTs for other systems. Accordingly, for two mobile system S 1 and S 2 P(S 2 ) = P(S 1 ∩ S 2 ) + P S 1 ∩ S 2 (13) we further have
Hence, when an app fails on a mobile system, it implies the increase of the probability that the app will fail if it is installed on other mobile systems. Similarly, when an attack happened on a mobile system, the probability that an attack with same contributory causes will happen on other systems will also increase.
V. RISKS ANALYSIS WITH HBRG-CASE STUDY
As discussed in the above sections, the HBRG model is able to analyze risks associated with apps or mobile system by integrating the static analysis, dynamic analysis, and behavior analysis into a BRG. One possible real-world risk is that posed by the Fake app patch, which is an issue which can be found in the Android environment.
For instance, Google published an app "Android market security (AMS)" to undo the side effects caused by Android. Rootcager is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android device. This app was automatically pushed to devices of users who had downloaded and installed an infected app. However, a repackaged version of AMS was found on third party app markets, and for discussion purposes the authors name it rAMS. Table III shows the potential risks in rAMS. The rAMS might threaten the users' privacy information and may cause other issues. As an example, HBRG was used to analyze rAMS to demonstrate how HBRG can be used in a risk analysis.
In risks evaluation of an app or system, the statistically learned CPTs require many samples to test whether one can or cannot cause other effect or make contribution on other risks. To characterize existing Android risky malware, particularly within static and dynamic analysis, most known risky features can be collected and classified that cover the majority of existing Android malware families. This helps to build a risks library for efficient evaluation of mobile security. Fortunately, the Malware Genome Project has collected more than 12 000 malware samples that cover the majority of existing Android malware families. It has been successfully used to detect most existing malware apps. In this paper, CPTs have been evaluated based on statistic results with the reported harmful features of apps.
In static analysis layer, the following features are first checked: 1) size; 2) permission requested by AMS and rAMS; and 3) package structure. This is shown in Tables I and II. The size of rAMS is bigger than that of AMS, which might be caused by repacking risks. It can be identified that the requested permissions are different and the rAMS requests extra permissions that could bring risks to the app and system. After checking the package structure, it is found that the structure for AMS and rAMS are different. AMS includes a "google.android" package that contains three subpackages googleapps and googlelogin, however in rAMS, the google.android package was obviously repackaged as mss.bg, which includes three new packages: transaction, ui, util. The 18 potential static risks in rAMS are analyzed in Fig. 4 , which involves permissions, Internet accessing, storage, and privacy, which are organized as 18 BRG nodes from S1 to S18 as shown in Fig. 5 . All risks combinations in this example are assumed to be OR-combinations for simplicity.
In the dynamic layer, further analysis of the dynamic risks can be carried out. By deassembling the app it was found that the rAMS is collecting the following information: (imei, version, smscentre, handled, pid, install time, sysversion, author, fare, and phonenumber). The collected information was saved in a hidden file upload.xml.
In the dynamic layer, it was found that the rAMS used the HTTP POST method and the related URL was identified as http://www.youlubg.com:82/Coop/request3.php. This means that the rAMS was able to send the collected information onward to a remote server. Based on the analysis at static layer, the following potential risks were identified: 1) repacking; 2) sending SMS; 3) receiving SMS; 4) http post; 5) http get; and 6) block sms, which are organized as BRG nodes D1 to D7. Two virtual nodes Da and Db are created and mapped to B3 and B4, respectively.
Similarly, at the behavior layer, behavioral risks could be identified based on matching with the behavioral risk lib. It is found that the rAMS is able to interact with the above identified server. By further checking the network activities of rAMS, it was found that the rAMS could receive commands from the reply generated by the POST request and save the commands into a hidden file serverinfo.xml. This identified a risk that the remote attackers are able to send SMS messages from the compromised device. rAMS also has the capability to block incoming SMS messages. Based on the behavior features extracted from genome project, four behavior risks are recognized from rAMS: B1: costs; B2: regularly connect third part server; B3: collecting privacy data; and B4: system leakage as shown in Fig. 4 .
An HBRG could be built as shown in Fig. 5 , in which the blue edges denote the intrarelations and the red edges denote inter-relations. Two virtual nodes, Da and Db, are created to reduce the relation space. Then is trivial to transform the HBRG model to a BN model, where the probabilities and CPTs are prespecified according to the statistical learning data. Fig. 6(a) shows the risk analysis at the static layer for rAMS, in which the joint probabilities are shown in CPT. As an example, Fig. 6(b) shows the CPT maintained by node "LOG_PRV." For rAMS, the static layer analysis shows there is only a 25.7% chance of rAMS at risk.
Similarly, based on HBRG, the app probability that rAMS is in risk was found to be 88.5% at dynamic layer and 46% at behavior layer. Fig. 7 shows the overall risk of rAMS is 77.7% and the risk score is 2.325(∈ [2.0 − 3.0]), which means rAMS is considered to be at the severe risk level.
In practice, if a risk occurred, it is possible to analyze the possible contributory causes and determine out-system causal effects as discussed in the above sections.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an HBRG model as a risk evaluation framework in Android mobile systems. The HBRG can provide users with a friendly risk evaluation framework, which is able to show users where the potential causes of risks exist. It will lead users to select apps with lower risk and help to know how secure their apps or systems are. It is also possible that this model will allow people to well understand the potential risks in their system and create an incentive for developer to create lower-risk apps that do not contain invasive ad networks and avoid over-requesting permissions. This paper is not the last word on the question of how to best present risk information, but future work will continue to investigate hidden risk mitigation and propagation in Android systems.
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